Articles Posted in Criminal Appeals

briefThe right to counsel in criminal proceedings is one of the key rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, but this right remains in many ways elusive for a significant number of people. A lengthy series of court decisions roughly defines the circumstances in which the government must provide counsel, at its own expense, for indigent defendants. An important ruling regarding the right to counsel in criminal appeals is Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). A court-appointed attorney who concludes that no non-frivolous grounds for appeal exist cannot simply withdraw from representation. The attorney must submit a document, commonly known as an Anders brief, identifying potential grounds for appeal, whether the attorney considers them frivolous or not. The defendant may then continue the appeal pro se, or the court may appoint new counsel. Earlier this year, a Texas appellate court affirmed that Anders briefs are required in certain non-criminal cases. In re N.A., No. 05-15-01220-CV, slip op. (Tex. App.—Dallas, Jan. 25, 2016).

The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized the federal government’s obligation to provide counsel for indigent defendants in the 1930s. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). It did not extend this duty to state felony cases for another 25 years. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Exactly when an indigent defendant becomes entitled to appointed counsel is still a matter of dispute to this day. The Supreme Court held in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), that the right to appointed counsel begins “at least…at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated.” Id. at 398. Texas and many other states have expanded the right to appointed counsel to indigent individuals in certain civil proceedings, including some juvenile cases and cases in which the state is seeking the involuntary termination of parental rights. Tex. Fam. Code § 107.013(a)(1).

Anders involved a dispute between a defendant and his appointed counsel over whether to file an appeal. The attorney concluded that there were no non-frivolous grounds for appeal. He notified the court that he would not file an appeal and that the defendant wanted to file one pro se. The notification consisted solely of a letter from the attorney. The defendant’s appeal was not successful, and he sought to reopen the case, claiming denial of the right to counsel. The Supreme Court eventually ruled that the attorney’s letter did not meet the standard of representation required by the Sixth Amendment.

Continue reading

Thomas Whitcombe [Public domain], via Wikimedia CommonsAsset forfeiture, by which the government seizes and takes title to property allegedly involved in criminal activity, has become a major revenue-generating activity for law enforcement agencies around the country. This has led to widespread criticism of the practice, since critics say that it often fails to protect property owners’ rights. A woman who was convicted of conspiracy to commit fraud and money laundering filed a lawsuit against the federal government in late 2015, claiming that law enforcement fraudulently enhanced the allegations against her in order to make a case for asset forfeiture. Scott v. United States, No. 1:15-cv-00173, pet. to vacate judgment (D. Wyo., Oct. 5, 2015). The court dismissed the suit on procedural grounds, finding it to be an improper collateral attack on the sentence. The case offers an interesting view of how people perceive the practice of asset forfeiture, and of the complexity of post-conviction motions in federal criminal cases.

Federal and state criminal statutes authorize forfeiture in criminal cases or in separate civil actions. See, e.g. 18 U.S.C. § 981 et seq., Tex. Code Crim. P. Art. 59.01 et seq. In many, possibly most, jurisdictions around the country, a court can grant prosecutors’ forfeiture claims even if no defendant is convicted of an actual crime. Property owners are not even entitled to notice of a forfeiture action in many cases, and forfeiture cases are often styled as the government “versus” a description of the asset.

The other notable aspect of the Scott case involves post-conviction challenges to a verdict or sentence. The law surrounding habeas corpus petitions is quite vast and complicated, but the current case specifically involves petitions filed within one year of the conviction, alleging that the sentence is unconstitutional or unlawful, that the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence, that the sentence exceeds the legal maximum sentence, or that the sentence “is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 18 U.S.C. § 2255. Before filing a “second or successive” petition under § 2255, a petitioner must request certification from an appellate court that the petition involves new evidence or a new constitutional rule made retroactive by the U.S. Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(h), 2244(b)(3).

Continue reading

By Thomas J. O'Halloran, photographer [Public domain], via Wikimedia CommonsThe U.S. Supreme Court denied the government’s petition for a writ of certiorari in a major securities fraud case last fall. Prosecutors were appealing a federal appellate court ruling that had not only reversed the defendants’ convictions but also dismissed the indictments filed against them. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014). The case initially seemed like a big win for federal prosecutors, who had accused two hedge fund portfolio managers of insider trading. The U.S. Attorney’s Office in New York has made prosecution of insider trading a priority. The Second Circuit’s decision, and the Supreme Court’s decision not to review it, affirms an important limitation on liability for alleged insider trading.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) generally defines the illegal type of “insider trading” as trading securities, particularly corporate stocks, based on “material, nonpublic information about the security.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1. It is not a distinct criminal offense under federal law but instead is based on various interpretations of the offense of securities fraud. Laws and regulations relating to insider trading are found in §§ 10(b) and 32 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78ff; and SEC Rules 10b-5 and 10b5-2, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5, 240.10b5-2.

Certain types of trades would seem to fit the SEC’s definition clearly. A corporate officer, for example, who possesses confidential information about the corporation’s financial status, would commit illegal insider trading if they traded their own corporation’s stock based on that information. This breaches the officer’s fiduciary duty to the corporation and is generally considered fraudulent. Trades based on “tips” from insiders, however, present a more complicated picture. The Supreme Court has held that “tippees”—i.e., people who receive insider tips and trade based on that information—are not liable for insider trading unless the tipper received some “personal benefit” for the tip. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 667 (1983).

Continue reading

Domenico Fetti [Public domain], via Wikimedia CommonsWhen legislators draft laws prescribing criminal punishments for certain acts, they must be precise when defining a criminal offense. Courts have struck down laws that are not “sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.” Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). Even with the best efforts of legislators and their staffs, however, sometimes a law presents multiple interpretations, and the courts must step in to resolve disputes between prosecutors and defendants. The U.S. Supreme Court recently heard oral arguments in a case, Lockhart v. United States, that shows just how contentious statutory interpretation can be.

Courts may apply a variety of rules, sometimes known as “canons,” when considering a portion of a statute that could have more than one interpretation. To give but one example, if a statute lists certain specific items to make a more general point, the ejusdem generis canon would indicate that “the general words should be limited to persons or things similar to those specifically enumerated.” United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 581 (1981). In a list consisting of “ostriches, emus, kiwis, and other animals,” the term “other animals” might therefore be interpreted as referring specifically to flightless birds, based on the examples that preceded it.

The statute before the Supreme Court in Lockhart deals with some highly unpleasant subject matter, but this is often where the most important legal developments occur. The defendant was charged under a statute that prohibits the possession, receipt, or distribution of child pornography. 18 U.S.C. § 2252. The statute includes a provision requiring a minimum 10-year prison sentence if the defendant has a prior conviction, under federal or state law, “relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward…” Id. at § 2252(b)(2). The dispute involved whether “involving a minor or ward” applies only to the third listed offense, “abusive sexual conduct,” or whether it applies to all three.

Continue reading

By Daniel Schwen (Own work) [CC BY-SA 4.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0)], via Wikimedia CommonsThe U.S. Supreme Court reached an important decision last summer in a challenge to a state constitutional amendment barring certain individuals from obtaining bail. The decision did not receive much media attention because the court simply declined to hear the case. This allowed the appellate court ruling, which struck down the amendment, to stand. Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2014). The constitutional amendment in question was from Arizona, and therefore it had no direct impact on Texas. It raised important issues, however, regarding bail and due process that apply nationwide. The Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari drew a written dissent from three of the court’s conservative justices, Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas. County of Maricopa v. Lopez-Valenzuela, 575 U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2046 (2015).

The amendment to Arizona’s constitution, Proposition 100, prohibited “granting undocumented immigrants arrested for a wide range of felony offenses any form of bail or pretrial release.” Lopez-Valenzuela, 770 F.3d at 775. Courts are given broad discretion in determining whether, and in what amount, to grant bail. The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits “excessive bail,” but it does not require courts to grant bail in all cases. Bail itself was not the issue in this case, but rather the limitation of bail to a specific group of people based on their actual or perceived national origin.

The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments state that a person may not “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V; see also U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. While the Fifth Amendment was generally understood to apply only to the federal government, the Fourteenth Amendment expressly extended this protection of individual rights to the states.

Continue reading

Mikerussell at en.wikipedia [CC BY-SA 3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via Wikimedia CommonsA man who is seeking release from prison, after serving nearly 30 years of a life sentence for a drug conviction, has sparked a discussion about drug laws and the punishments they impose. What makes this story particularly notable is that the conduct that led to his conviction occurred when he was a juvenile under the laws of Michigan, where he lived and is now incarcerated. A state law in effect at the time mandated life imprisonment for certain drug offenses. The state has since substantially reformed that law, and this individual is reportedly the only person still serving a life sentence because of it. Despite that, prosecutors have opposed his efforts to seek a reduction in his sentence, and a state appellate court has ruled in their favor.

According to media reports on the case, law enforcement officers recruited the defendant as a confidential informant when he was only 14 years old. He reportedly helped bring down several major drug dealers and a group of corrupt Detroit police officers. He eventually became a drug dealer in his own right, though, and he was arrested in 1987 at the age of 17.

Prosecutors charged the defendant with possession with intent to deliver 650 grams or more of cocaine. At that time, a Michigan law—known as the “650-Lifer Law”—imposed a mandatory life sentence, with the possibility of parole, for the possession of at least 650 grams, equal to about 1.43 pounds, of cocaine. The defendant’s service as a police informant was inadmissible at trial, and the judge characterized him as “worse than a mass murderer.” People v. Wershe, 166 Mich. App. 602, 604 (1988). He began serving a life sentence in 1988, after he had turned 18 years old. Since then, most of the people he helped the police send to prison for various violent crimes have been released.

Continue reading

flosca [Public domain, CC0 1.0 (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/deed.en)], via PixabayThe Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently granted a petition for habeas corpus relief in one of the most infamous Texas criminal cases of the past few decades. Ex parte Keller, No. WR-36,684-02, opinion (Tex. Crim. App., May 20, 2015). The petitioner and her husband owned and operated a daycare center in Austin, Texas, until they were caught up in what has come to be known as the “Satanic ritual abuse” panic of the 1980s. They spent 21 years in jail for child abuse—based on highly questionable evidence—before the state released them in late 2013. The habeas corpus petition asserted that the conviction was based on false testimony from the state’s expert witness and that the petitioner was innocent of any criminal offense. The court granted the petition on the false testimony claim but rejected the “actual innocence” claim. This decision highlights the bizarre legal view of “innocence” once a person has been convicted of a crime.

In our criminal justice system, “guilt” and “innocence” have very specific meanings that non-lawyers may not always understand. At trial, the prosecution has the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the finder of fact, which could be the judge or a jury, finds that the state has met this burden, it enters a verdict of “guilty.” Otherwise, it enters a verdict of “not guilty.”

A “not guilty” verdict is not the same as a finding of “innocence.” To most prosecutors and law enforcement officials, a “not guilty” verdict only means that the prosecutor failed to convince the jury of a person’s guilt, not that the person is actually innocent of the offense. The state tends to apply a much broader definition of “guilty,” though—often taking a “guilty” verdict as proof that a person committed the offense, not merely that the state met its burden of proof. “Actual innocence” thus becomes just one possible argument a defendant could raise on appeal or in a habeas petition, which might not even provide sufficient grounds, by itself, to reverse a conviction. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993).

Continue reading

647478939_938710c425_oThe Bill of Rights provides several critically important protections in criminal cases. The Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures prohibits the arrest of a person without, at a minimum, probable cause. The Fifth Amendment states that a person may not “be compelled…to be a witness against himself,” which is the major component of the “right to remain silent” in criminal cases. These protections all come into play when a person confesses to a crime during a police interrogation. An appellate court in Illinois issued a ruling late last year that rebuked the state’s claim of a “voluntary” confession. Illinois v. Jackson, 2014 IL App (3d) 120239. The ruling highlighted the dangers presented when the government does not respect the protections of the Bill of Rights during an investigation. Although this case is from Illinois, it draws on U.S. Supreme Court precedent that affects Texas as well.

The case involved charges of first-degree murder for a fatal shooting in August 2009. Police arrested the defendant without a warrant in March 2010. An eyewitness to the shooting had reportedly told the police on several occasions that, while he was acquainted with the defendant, he did not know the shooter. He testified that “the officers would not accept this explanation” and, during an interrogation in late February 2010, kept showing him the defendant’s photo. Id. at 6. Eventually, he told the officers that the photo “resembled” the person he saw pull the gun. Id. This apparently formed the entire basis for the defendant’s arrest about a week later, since the police found no other evidence linking the defendant to the scene of the crime.

The defendant did not expressly state that he wanted a lawyer or that he was invoking his right to remain silent. He testified that he began answering the officers’ questions because he “got tired of them nagging.” Id. at 5. The court’s order includes a portion of the transcript of the police interrogation in which a detective tries to convince the defendant, who is African-American, to confess by telling him that he will not be able to get a fair jury trial because of his race, and because of prejudices harbored by not only the jurors but the judge. He even claims that this prejudice will “negate the credibility of any witnesses he might call.” Id. at 38.
Continue reading

speech-35342_640.pngText messages sent from mobile phones have become a common method of communication in recent years, but as with most new technologies, our justice system has not fully caught up. Courts are still considering various questions regarding when prosecutors may use text messages as evidence of guilt in a criminal case. This includes questions of authentication, such as whether the state must prove that a defendant actually wrote a specific text message, or merely that a witness received the text and believed it to be from the defendant. Courts in Texas and other states have reached different conclusions on this issue in recent months.

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that, once the state has established that the text messages exist on a witness’ phone, it is up to the jury to assess whether the messages are authentic. Butler v. State, No. PD-0456-14, slip op. (Tex. Crim. App., Apr. 22, 2015). This case involved a kidnapping charge, and the state called the kidnapping victim to testify about text messages received from the defendant. The Court of Appeals held that the state failed to authenticate text messages allegedly sent by the defendant and reversed the conviction.

The Court of Criminal Appeals reinstated the conviction, noting that authentication generally only requires “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Id. at 7, quoting Tex. R. Evid. 901(a). The witness’ testimony, the court held, was sufficient, and the rest was within the discretion of a reasonable jury.
Continue reading

US100DollarBills-Old&2013.jpgThe Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently considered a defendant’s claim that a district court erred in his trial, in which he was convicted of passing counterfeit money, by admitting the counterfeit bill into evidence. The appellate court reviewed the standards for authentication of evidence and the chain of custody of the bill. It concluded that the U.S. Attorney had met its burden of authenticating the bill and, after considering several other issues raised by the defendant, affirmed the district court’s verdict and sentence. United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 2014).

The defendant was accused of attempting to pass forged $100 bills at a Taco Bell on March 9, 2012, and at a Dollar Tree on April 11, 2012. A grand jury indicted him on two counts of uttering counterfeit obligations or securities. 18 U.S.C. § 472. Federal law prohibits passing or attempting to pass counterfeited, forged, or altered currency with the intent to defraud. A single count can result in up to 20 years in prison.

The court conducted a bench trial and found him guilty of the second count, which involved Dollar Tree. It acquitted him of the count involving Taco Bell. The court sentenced the defendant to 34 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release, and a special assessment of $100. The sentence was based on a finding that the defendant had produced the counterfeit bills or had the means of producing counterfeit bills in his possession. Davis, 754 F.3d at 281, citing U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2B5.1(b)(2)(A).
Continue reading